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IN RE ESTATE OF FERDINAND E. MARCOS
HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION: A
PERSONAL ACCOUNT OF THE ROLE OF
THE SPECIAL MASTER
Sol Schreiber* and Laura D. Weissbach**
I. INTRODUCTION
The role of the special master in mass tort litigation is expanding.
Courts have long been wary of class certification in such cases be-
cause of the potentially crippling time burdens on both judge and
jury. A special master, working with the parties, can significantly re-
duce these burdens and fashion methods of recovery allowing prompt
resolution consistent with the mandates of due process In re Estate
of Marcos Human Rights Litigation,2 the first class action human
rights case, tested the ability of the court and its special master to
fashion a framework for a jury trial involving 9541 class members
seeking compensatory damages
II. BACKGROUND
In 1965 Ferdinand E. Marcos ("Marcos") became president of
the Philippines. 4 In September 1972 Marcos imposed martial law on
the Philippines purportedly to maintain law and order, but practically
* Sol Schreiber, a partner at Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes & Lerach LLP,
New York City, serves as the court-appointed Special Master in the In re Estate of
Marcos Human Rights Litigation, the subject of this Article.
** Laura D. Weissbach, an attorney at Milberg, Weiss, Bershad, Hynes &
Lerach LLP, assists Special Master Schreiber in the In re Estate of Marcos Hu-
man Rights Litigation.
1. "A due process analysis must weigh defendant's claim to the right to trial
in each individual case against judicial economy and manageability by use of a
valid statistical procedure .... [D]ue process is not necessarily limited to the
traditional sense ... ." In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 910 F. Supp.
1460, 1467 (D. Haw. 1995).
2. 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995).
3. See id. at 1464-67.
4. See id. at 1462.
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to avoid term limits.5 Marcos' power increased as he issued various
orders." He appointed himself commander in chief of the armed
forces,7 authorized the arrests of dissidents,8 dissolved the legislature,
9
and granted himself control of the executive and judicial branches of
the Philippine government.'0
In February 1986 Marcos and his family fled to Hawaii." Shortly
after Marcos arrived, and while he was a resident of Hawaii, a num-
ber of parties served him with complaints seeking damages for hu-
man rights abuses committed against them or their decedents by the
Marcos regime.12 Finding that the cases were nonjusticiable under the
"act of state" doctrine, district courts in both Hawaii and California
dismissed the complaints. 3 In Trajano v. Marcos,1 4 the Ninth Circuit
reversed these decisions in consolidated appeals. The Judicial Panel
on Multidistrict Litigation then consolidated the various actions in
the District of Hawaii. 5 After Marcos died, his estate (the "Estate")
was substituted as the defendant in the litigation. 6
In 1991 the district court certified the matter as a class action, 7
defining the class as all civilian citizens of the Philippines or their de-
cedents who, between September 1972 and February 1986, suffered
torture, summary execution, or disappearance at the hands of Philip-
pine military or paramilitary groups.8
District Judge Manuel L. Real ordered that the liability and
damages phases would be tried separately.'9 On September 22, 1992,
the jury found the defendants liable to the class.2' The damage trial
5. See id.
6. See id. at 1463.
7. See id.
& See id.
9. See id. at 1462.
10. See id. at 1463.
11. See id.
12. See id. at 1461.
13. See Trajano v. Marcos, Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039, 1989 WL 76894, at *1 (9th
Cir. July 10, 1989). The "act of state" doctrine "is a prudential doctrine that pre-
vents the judiciary from embroiling itself in [foreign] affairs over which it has lit-
tle or no power." Id. at *2 (quoting Republic of the Philippines v. Marcos, 862
F.2d 1355, 1360 (9th Cir. 1988) (en banc)).
14. Id. at *1.
15. See In re Estate of Marcos Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1469 (9th
Cir. 1994).
16. See id.
17. See In re Estate of Marcos, 25 E3d at 1469.
18. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1461.
19. See id. at 1462.
20. See id. at 1463.
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was then further bifurcated into one trial for exemplary damages and
one for compensatory damages.' Claimants received notice through
the mail and U.S. and Philippine publications. In order to opt into the
class, members were required to file proof of claim forms. In re-
sponse, 10,059 proof of claim forms were filed, but the district court
found 538 claims facially invalid, of which 20 were reinstated, leaving
the number of facially valid claims at 9541.2 On February 23, 1994,
the jury awarded plaintiffs $1.2 billion in exemplary damages.'
Judge Real appointed Sol Schreiber to serve as special master in
the compensatory damages phase of the litigation.24 The special mas-
ter's responsibilities included determining how to present sufficient
testimonial evidence in order to compensate the class since it would
have been impracticable to hold a trial for each case or even to de-
pose all claimants.' The court concluded that a random sampling of a
statistically significant number of claimants' depositions would be
adequate.' These depositions were taken in accordance with a com-
puter-generated plan developed by James Dannemiller, the president
of a research and consulting company called SMS, Inc., and approved
by the court.V Of the 10,059 claims originally filed in the matter, 137
were randomly selected to represent the class.2' After an evidentiary
hearing, these 137 claimants and their witnesses were to be deposed
in the Philippines under the supervision of several special masters
who were appointed by Special Master Schreiber and approved by
Judge Real.29 After arriving there, however, a Philippine court or-
dered the special masters to cease supervising the depositions and
Special Master Schreiber ordered them to return to the United
States. The court instructed plaintiffs' counsel to continue taking the
depositions. Thus, the 137 claimants and their witnesses were deposed
in the Philippines during October and November of 1994.30 The
defendant chose not to attend any of the depositions.31 In an order
dated November 14, 1994, the court directed Special Master Schrei-
ber to review the depositions to determine the following: (1) whether
21. See id. at 1462.
22. See id. at 1462 & n.1.
23. See id. at 1464.
24. See id. at 1465 n.9.
25. See id. at 1465.
26. See id
27. See id. at 1464-65.
28. See id.
29. See id. at 1465.
30. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1465.
31. See id.
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the claimed abuse fell within one of the definitions (torture, summary
execution, or disappearance) with which the court charged the jury at
the liability phase of the trial held in Hawaii; (2) whether the Philip-
pine military or paramilitary was involved in such abuse; and (3)
whether the abuse occurred during the period of Marco's regime be-
tween September 1972 and February 1986.32 Subsequently, the plain-
tiffs submitted proof of claim forms along with their supporting
deposition transcripts to Special Master Schreiber.33
Pursuant to Rule 706 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,' the
court also directed, Special Master Schreiber to review the proof of
claim forms as a court-appointed expert on damages and to recom-
mend to the jury compensatory damages for the 137 claimants as well
as the remaining class members. 5 The Special Master issued a report
for the jury and the court in the compensatory damages trial in which
he made recommendations for both the randomly sampled claimants
of torture, summary execution, and disappearance as well as for the
remaining claimants within each category. 6 The court compiled these
recommendations from the proof of claim forms and their supporting
deposition transcripts.
Special Master Schreiber reviewed the 137 randomly selected
claims and their respective supporting deposition transcripts in ac-
cordance with the following: the court's Reference Order; the in-
structions of Judge Real; the court's charges to the jury at the trial
held in Hawaii defining torture, summary execution, and disappear-
ance; Plaintiffs' Memorandum re Legal Principles Applicable to
Findings of the Special Master submitted pursuant to Special Master
Order No. 6, to which defendant did not submit any legal memo-
randa;39 and Plaintiffs' Supplemental Memorandum re Legal Princi-
ples Applicable to Finding of the Special Master.'
32. See Ud
33. See id.
34. FED. R. EvID. 706(a). "The court may appoint any expert witnesses
agreed upon by the parties, and may appoint expert witnesses of its own selec-
tion." Id.
35. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1465.
36. See id. at 1466.
37. See id. at 1465-66.
38. Court's Reference Order, In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D.
Haw. 1995) (No. 86-0390).
39. Plaintiff's Memorandum Re Legal Principles Applicable to Findings of
the Special Master, In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D. Haw. 1995)
(No. 86-0390).
40. Plaintiff's Supplemental Memorandum Re Legal Principles Applicable to
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The following findings in the Special Master's Report, of ap-
proximately 200 pages, were submitted to the jury and the court:
(1) Of the 137 randomly selected claims, 131 were deemed valid
within the definitions of torture, summary execution, or disappear-
ance with which the court charged the jury.
(2) The Philippine military or paramilitary, including but not
limited to, elements of the Philippine Army, the Armed Forces of the
Philippines, the Philippine Constabulary, the Civilian Home Defense
Force, the Composite Infantry Battalion, the National Intelligence
Security Agency, the Military Intelligence Group, and the Bar-
rio/Barangay Self-Defense Unit were involved in the abuse of the
valid claims.
(3) The abuses occurred during the period of September 1972
through February 1986.41
III. DETERMINATION OF DAMAGES
The court determined that 6 of the 137 randomly sampled claims
were invalid.4' Of those 6, 3 were torture claims, 2 were summary
execution claims, and 1 was a disappearance claim.43 Thus, out of the
137 reviewed, 64 of the 67 torture claims were found to be valid, 50 of
the 52 summary execution claims were found to be valid, and 17 of
the 18 disappearance claims were found to be valid, leaving 131 valid
randomly sampled claims."
The special master recommended that compensatory damages,
determined in U.S. dollars, be awarded to the 131 valid claimants:
(1) Torture: $3,310,000 for the 64 valid claims, an average of
$51,719 per valid claim.
(2) Summary Execution: $6,425,767 also reflective of lost earn-
ings for the 50 valid claims, an average of $128,515 per valid claim.
The total lost earnings for the 50 valid claims in this category was
$2,162,767, an average of approximately $43,255 per valid claim.
(3) Disappearance: $1,833,515 including lost earnings for the 17
valid claims, an average of $107,853 per valid claim. The total lost
earnings for the 17 valid claims in this category was $613,605, an av-
erage of approximately $36,094 per valid claim..
Based upon the invalid claims, a five percent invalidity rate was
Findings of the Special Master, In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460 (D.
Haw. 1995) (No. 86-0390).
41. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1465.
42. See Hilao v. Estate of Marcos, 103 F.3d 767,783 (9th Cir. 1996).
43. See id. at 783 n.8.
44. See id. at 783.
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utilized to establish awards for the 9541 claims filed and determined
facially valid, less those 137 randomly sampled.4 ' Damages for the
entire class of valid claims were calculated in the following manner:
(1) Torture:
There were approximately 5372 torture claims filed, 179 of which
were ordered facially invalid, leaving 5193.4 Using the five percent
invalidity rate, about 4933 would be valid. In order to determine ap-
proximately how many claims in this category would be compen-
sated, the 64 torture claims found to be valid were subtracted from
the 4933 to reach the figure of 4869. The average award of the 64
valid torture claims was $51,719; this was reached by dividing
$3,310,000, the total damages for the valid claims by 64. Finally,
$51,719 multiplied by 4,869 is $251,819,811, which was added to
$3,310,000 to reach $255,129,811, representing the total recom-
mended damages to valid torture claims.
(2) Summary Execution:
Approximately 3677 summary execution claims were filed, 273 of
which were ordered facially invalid, leaving 3404.47 Using the five
percent invalidity rate, about 3234 would be valid. In order to de-
termine approximately how many claims in this category would be
compensated, the 50 summary execution claims found to be valid
were subtracted from the 3234 to reach the figure of 3184. The ap-
proximate average award of the 50 valid summary execution claims,
including lost earnings, was $128,515; this was reached by dividing
$6,425,767, total damages for the valid claims, by 50. Finally, $128,515
multiplied by 3184 is $409,191,760, which was added to $6,425,767 to
reach $415,617,527, representing the total recommended damages,
including lost earnings, to valid summary execution claims.
To determine total lost earnings for the summary execution
category, $43,255-the average lost earnings for the 50 valid claims-
was multiplied by 3184, the approximate number of total valid claims
less the 50 already determined to be valid, to reach $137,723,920. The
total lost earnings for the 50 of $2,162,767 was added to $137,723,920
to reach $139,886,687, the total lost earnings for summary execution
claims. All 50 valid claims reviewed were factored into the average
lost earnings. Although not all claims were awarded lost earnings,
this was necessary to account for the claims not reviewed which also
had no lost earnings. Thus, of $415,617,527, the total recommended
45. See id.
46. See id.
47. See id.
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damages for the summary execution category, $139,886,687 repre-
sented lost earnings.
(3) Disappearance:
Approximately 1010 disappearance claims were filed, 66 of
which were ordered facially invalid, leaving 944.' Using a five per-
cent invalidity rate, about 897 would be valid. In order to determine
approximately how many claims in this category would be compen-
sated, the 17 disappearance claims found to be valid were subtracted
from the 897 to reach the figure of 880. The approximate average
award of the 17 valid disappearance claims, including lost earnings,
was $107,853; this was reached by dividing $1,833,515-total damages
for the 17 valid claims- by 17. Finally, $107,853 multiplied by 880 is
$94,910,640, which was added to $1,833,515 to reach $96,744,155 rep-
resenting the total recommended damages, including lost earnings, to
valid disappearance claims.
To determine total lost earnings for the disappearance category,
$36,094, the average lost earnings for the 17 valid claims, was multi-
plied by 880, the approximate number of total valid claims less the 17
already determined to be valid, to reach $31,762,720. The total lost
earnings for the 17 of $613,605 was added to $31,762,720 to reach
$32,376,325, the total lost earnings for disappearance claims. All 17
valid claims reviewed were factored into the average lost earnings.
Although not all claims were awarded lost earnings, this was neces-
sary to account for the claims not reviewed which also had no lost
earnings. Thus, of $96,744,155, the total recommended damages for
the disappearance category, $32,376,325 represents lost earnings.
Therefore, the total of $767,491,493 was the amount recom-
mended as damages to compensate the entire class of valid claim-
ants.49 For all three categories, moral damages as a proximate result
of defendant's wrongful acts or omissions were weighed into the
compensation. °
A. Damages for Torture Victims
Each of the valid torture claims was given a ranking from one to
five, with five representing the worst abuses and suffering. The claims
were evaluated based on Judge Real's decision in Trajano v. Imee
Marcos-Manotoc,51 as part of this matter as well as the following
48. See id.
49. See id. at 784.
50. See PHIL. Cr. CODE ANN. arts. 2216,2217.
51. 878 F.2d 1439 (9th Cir. 1989).
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considerations: (1) physical torture, including what methods were
used and/or abuses were suffered; (2) mental abuse, including fright
and anguish; (3) amount of time torture lasted; (4) length of deten-
tion, if any; (5) physical and/or mental injuries; (6) victim's age; and
(7) actual losses, including medical bills. 2 Although each claim of tor-
ture was unique, the special master determined that sufficient simi-
larities existed within a rating category to recommend a standard
damage amount to each victim within that grouping.53 Therefore, the
court concluded that valid torture claimants be awarded damages in
the following manner 4
Rating Recommended Number of Total Damages
Damages Valid Claims Within Rating
1 $ 20,000 6 $ 120,000
2 $ 30,000 23 $ 690,000
3 $ 50,000 13 $ 650,000
4 $ 75,000 14 $1,050,000
5 $100,000 8 $ 800,000
Total Damages for Randomly
Selected Claims of Torture Victims =$ 3,310,000
B. Damages for Summary Execution and Disappearance Victims
1. Lost earnings
For valid summary execution and disappearance claims, the exis-
tence of torture prior to a victim's death or disappearance weighed
into the determination of damages for these categories.55 Loss of
earnings was also factored into each of the recommended damage
awards.56 The formula applied to determine lost earnings was that es-
tablished by the Philippine Supreme Court: 2/3 x (80 - age at death) x
annual income (in pesos) = aggregate lost earnings., After the ag-
gregate lost earnings were computed, the result was converted into
52- See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. 1460, 1466 (D. Haw. 1995).
53. See id.
54. See Hilao, 103 F.3d at 783.
55. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1466.
56. See PHIL. CIV. CODE ANN. art. 2206.
57. See People v. Suitos, 220 SCRA 419, 430 (1993); People v. Quilaton, 205
SCRA 288,288-90 (1992).
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American dollars by dividing the sum by 24, which was the approxi-
mate then-current exchange rate between U.S. dollars and Philippine
pesos.' Because discrepancies existed among transcripts, with some
stating income earned in gross, some in net, and some giving no
amount, the special master determined that it was necessary to place
a $120,000 cap upon lost earnings a claimant could receive. 9
The court used an average for a particular occupation when a
witness did not indicate the amount of income earned by a summary
execution or disappearance victim."
For example, when the victim was a farmer, the average
earnings for one harvesting the same crop on the same
amount of land was used. If a person stated the victim's in-
come in terms of per-harvest, and if there were three har-
vests per year, for example, then that victim's earnings
would be multiplied by three. For any victim who did not
work, there was no award given for lost earnings.6'
2. Total damages
Computation of the total amount of damages for summary exe-
cution and disappearance victims depended on individual facts. Dif-
ferent variables went into the equation, including: (1) torture prior to
death or disappearance; (2) the actual killing or disappearance; (3)
the victim's family's mental anguish; and (4) lost earnings, calculated
in the above described manner.
62
IV. DAMAGES LAW
In calculating the amount of damages awarded to the 137 indi-
vidual claims, the special master determined the law to be applied.63
After reviewing the issue of human rights violations, it appeared that
various jurisdictions' precedents and codes were determinative. In
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala," Judge Nickerson found that Congress had en-
trusted the task of enforcing international law prohibiting torture "to
the federal courts and gave them power to choose and develop fed-
eral remedies to effectuate the purposes of the international law
58. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1466.
59. See id.
60. See id
61. Id.
62. See id. at 1466-67.
63. See id. at 1466.
64. 577 F Supp. 860 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
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incorporated into the United States common law."65 In order to as-
certain the award of damages, the Filartiga court found that it was
"appropriate to look first to Paraguayan law [the nation where the
abuse occurred] in determining the remedy for the violation of inter-
national law.""
Although the judgment in Trajano did not explicitly state which
jurisdiction's law(s) applied,67 Special Master Schreiber found that in
this case Judge Real appeared to utilize Philippine, international, and
American law, given that he made findings for the following: (1) lost
earnings; (2) physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, bodily injury,
and wrongful death; (3) loss of comfort, society and support, and
mental anguish; and (4) punitive damages." Moreover, Judge Real
placed the amount of damages in U.S. dollars.69 Other cases involving
similar issues had done the same.70 Thus, the court based the recom-
mended damages upon Philippine law, including its Civil Code as well
as its damage case law, international law, and American law.'
V. APPROVAL OF METHODOLOGY
A. District Court
In In re Estate of Ferdinand E. Marcos Human Rights Litigation,
Judge Real held that the use of inferential statistics to ascertain the
damages suffered by the class members was constitutional on both
due process and Seventh Amendment grounds.73 The District Court
found the Estate was afforded its due process rights under the three-
65. Id. at 863.
66. Id. at 864.
67. See Trajano v. Marcos, Nos. 86-2448, 86-15039, 1989 WL 76894, at *1-2
(9th Cir. July 10, 1989).
68. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1466.
69. See id.
70. See Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 577 F Supp. 860,867 (E.D.N.Y 1984).
71. See Abebe Jira v. Negewo, No. 90-2010,1993 WL 814304 (N.D.Ga. Aug. 20,
1993) (awarding $200,000 for physical and non-physical injuries to a victim of tor-
ture); Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 502 F Supp. 259, 266-67 (D.D.C. 1980)
(awarding $110,000 for pain and suffering to the families of two murder victims).
72. 910 F Supp. 1460.
73. See id. at 1469. The Seventh Amendment to the United States Constitu-
tion provides for trial by jury in suits at common law. U.S. CONST. amend. VII.
The amendment "was designed to preserve the basic institution of jury trial in
only its most fundamental elements, not the great mass of procedural forms and
details, varying even then so widely among common-law jurisdictions." In re
Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1468 (quoting Galloway v. United States, 319
U.S. 372,392 (1943)).
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prong test identified in Mathews v. Eldridge.4 Under that test, the
court must balance the following three factors "in determining what
kind of process is due[:] ... (1) the private interest affected, (2) the
risk of erroneous deprivation of the interest through the procedures
used, and (3) the government's interest, including all fiscal and ad-
ministrative burdens that the additional procedure would require.""
Because defendant had its day in court with a jury, Judge Real found
the Seventh Amendment right was maintained.76
The court also held that the aggregation of compensatory dam-
age claims was appropriate on federal common law grounds.' The
case arose under both the Alien Tort Statute ("ATS")" and the Tor-
ture Victim Protection Act ("TVPA"). 7' Because Congress in the
TVPA did not offer a methodology for determining damages, the
court reasoned that "federal courts are free to and should create fed-
eral common law to provide justice for any injury contemplated" by
the ATS or the TVPA.80 The court applied this approach through the
aggregation methodology.8'
B. Ninth Circuit
The Ninth Circuit, in a two-to-one panel decision, affirmed the
district court's opinion.2 In a thorough analysis, Judge Betty B.
Fletcher determined that the methodology, while unorthodox, was
justified by the unusual nature of the case and met the requirements
of due process.
VI. THE REFLECTIONS OF THE SPECIAL MASTER
When Judge Real asked me to serve as special master in this
case, I knew that it would be impractical, if not impossible, to hold
hearings on approximately 10,000 claims. I relied in part on Judge
Robert M. Parker's analysis in Cimino v. Raymark Industries, Inc.Y In
74. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 E Supp. at 1468 (quoting Mathews v. Eld-
ridge, 424 U.S. 319,335 (1976)).
75. Id. at 1468 (quoting Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335).
76. See id. at 1469.
77. See id.
78. 28 U.S.C. § 1350 (1994).
79. Pub. L. 102-256, Mar. 12, 1992, 106 Stat. 73.
80. In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1469.
81. See id.
82. See Hilao v. Estate of Ferdinand Marcos, 103 F.3d 767, 768 (9th Cir.
1996).
83. 751 E Supp. 649 (E.D. Tex. 1990).
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that case, the court ordered a random sampling to determine overall
damages for the class.' Cimino, along with other Rule 23 prece-
dents,' provided procedural guidance for handling the claims in the
Marcos matter.
Substantively, various issues determined what type of damages
were recoverable. For example, the court concluded that, based upon
Philippine law, lost earnings were relevant only to summary execution
and disappearance claims.' What was often difficult to decipher,
however, was the amount a victim earned. Because claimants often
spoke in terms of hectares or growing/harvesting seasons, no standard
existed by which to determine an individual's income or to compare
one person's earnings to that of another. The lack of education of
many of the claimants often prevented them from completely ex-
plaining their earnings. Therefore, the imposition of a floor and ceil-
ing on lost earnings proved to be the most equitable course of action.
In determining compensation for torture victims, I was con-
fronted with placing a value on a range of tortious conduct, ranging
from relatively short detainments to brutal beatings. Again, the
deposition transcripts revealed that many claimants lacked the vo-
cabulary to fully describe the horrors which they endured. Consider-
ing the relative lack of education on the part of some claimants and
the range of suffering, I believed it was equitable to assign a specific
ranking to each torture claim. By assigning a number upon comple-
tion of the initial review of a transcript, I could justly compare each
torture claim upon completion of reading all the depositions. I found
this procedure necessary given my unfamiliarity at the start of the
review with the considerable range of brutalities. After examining
each of the claims, I summarized them into one-page synopses so
comparisons could be made. The summaries also aided the jury in
making comparisons.
Under the unusual and egregious circumstances of this case, I
believe the Report, submitted to the jury for its ultimate determina-
tion, abides by constitutional due process and Seventh Amendment
law. The fact that the jury's decision differed slightly from my de-
terminations adds support to the methodology utilized in the Report.
For example, the jury reinstated three of the five claims which I found
to be invalid, did not follow 46 of the recommendations for statisti-
cally sampled claims, and returned a verdict of $770 million, after
84. See id. at 664.
85. See In re Estate of Marcos, 910 F. Supp. at 1469.
86. See id at 1466.
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seven days of trial and deliberation, which was only slightly higher
than the recommended awards for damages of approximately $767.5
million.
VII. CONCLUSION
The compensatory damages trial of the Marcos litigation illus-
trates the use of the science of inferential statistics to overcome the
laborious and inefficient method of individual proof of damages. The
special master played an important role in fashioning the methodol-
ogy, coordinating the pretrial phase, and summarizing the evidence
for the jury. The end result, an aggregate award based upon individ-
ual proof from 137 randomly selected class members, fully satisfied
due process and protected against an excessive award.
488 LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:475
